QJM Advance Access originally published online on May 6, 2005
QJM 2005 98(6):387-402; doi:10.1093/qjmed/hci071
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© The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Association of Physicians. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oupjournals.org
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The effect of Prime Minister Anthony Eden's illness on his decision-making during the Suez crisis
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Based on the Lord Henry Cohen History Of Medicine Lecture, University Of Liverpool, 22 February 2005 |
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On 26 July 1956, the anniversary of King Farouk's abdication in Manshiya Square in Alexandria, the Egyptian President Abdel Nasser announced in a passionate speech the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. Under the terms of the Suez Canal Base agreement, the last British troops had left Port Said on 13 June 1956, and it was the man who had negotiated that controversial agreement as Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, who was now Prime Minister and feeling under political pressure from within his Conservative Party. At the time that Nasser was telling the crowd with nationalistic fervour that ‘In the past we were kept waiting in the offices of the British High Commissioner and the British Ambassador’, Eden was hosting a dinner in 10 Downing Street for King Faisal of Iraq and his Prime Minister.
Nasser was a popular nationalistic leader who cleverly tried to demonstrate, in the way he
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